We present a model of urban resilience where the pattern of disaster recovery is defined by forcibly evacuating the population of a city and then allowing people to return voluntarily. The model predicts the post-disaster population composition of a city, changes in its income distribution and citizen welfare, and changes in the level of public goods. Plausible ex-ante assumptions about urban characteristics lead to a post-disaster city that is smaller, more skill-intensive, and with higher mean educational attainment. The evolution of income inequality is more complex, even though unskilled wages rise, middle-class flight may cause income distribution to worsen. The analysis of disasters' long term impact on fiscal structure and on demographic, income, and human capital distribution, illustrates the interplay of major determinants of resilience after a natural disaster. A stylized New Orleans around the time of its 2005 Katrina disaster is incorporated for realism and used as an example throughout. Predicted changes are broadly consistent with observed effects of Katrina on New Orleans.
Introduction
Our model of urban disaster resilience is based on a simple logical chain. When a city is evacuated in the face of disaster, not everyone goes back. Returnees are not a random sample of the original population because the decision to return depends on individual characteristics and on the post-disaster choice set. But recovery depends on who returns. Therefore, if resilience is defined as the ability to recover from disaster, the seeds of urban resilience are sown before disaster strikes.
We present a model that formally lays out this logical structure and explains how urban resilience to disaster is shaped by forcing the population of a city to evacuate and then allowing people to return voluntarily. We will use New Orleans as the motivating example of disaster evacuation and recovery, but we believe that the forces of resilience which we explore are relevant to any of countless events of the past century that involved a sizable and prolonged evacuation. Examples include Darwin, Australia in 1974 (typhoon), Mississauga, Canada in 1979 (chlorine leak), Netherlands in 1995 (flooding), China in 1988 (flooding), Sri Lanka in 2004 (tsunami), Philippines in 2014 (typhoon), Fort McMurray, Canada (wildfire) and Syria (civil war) in 2016. Every major disaster has its own story and every evacuee has his own reasons for deciding if and when to return. We show that the post-disaster configuration of a city as well as its eventual recovery depend on the non-random selection of returnees.
We set the stage with an illustrative example, an informal narrative of the immediate impact of Katrina on New Orleans and of the long term changes it caused.
New Orleans and Katrina
The complete evacuation of a major city like the one that took place in New Orleans after hurricane Katrina is unprecedented in American history. The extent of the evacuation makes this case. Businesses, schools, and public services shut down. Almost everybody left the city. Not only was the scope of the evacuation exceptional, its duration was too. The first people to return were men. New Orleans was a rough and dangerous place when they began straggling back in late September 2005. Entire city blocks had burned to the ground. Thugs roamed the streets. Trees and power lines were down. Stop signs and signs with street and store names had blown away. There were no working traffic lights, no open stores, no functioning gas stations. The banks were all closed and, without power lines and phones, ATM machines and credit cards were useless. In the city's soft alluvial soil, broken water mains readily formed potholes big enough to rip an axle off your car. There was no electricity, no cooking gas, no cell phone service. And, if you were lucky enough to have water, it was for flushing; you did not dare drink it or bathe in it.
As the metropolitan community made up of New Orleans and the less publicized St. Bernard Parish and Slidell attempted to reconstitute itself, it became clear that the pieces no longer fit together quite the way they used to. Mayor Ray Nagin urged New Orleanians to return. Parents asked, "Return to what?" There was no place to live and no place to enroll the kids. One of the first things the city did after the hurricane was to fire all teachers. People improvised. There was the Sugarcane Academy, founded when a small group of evacuees sought refuge together in the Cajun city of Lafayette. Someone recognized two out-of-work public school teachers on the street. They got together in a sugarcane field and held classes for two months, then moved the entire operation back to New Orleans to empty classrooms on the Loyola University campus and the public school continued to operate there. There were the 5 private schools that re-opened make-shift classes in October, by combining students to fill a singleef roster. The 7 best public schools broke off from the official system and re-opened to a diminished student body-many teachers gone-in mid-January. At least as important as the physical transformation brought about by the hurricane, looters, insurance cancellations, and human folly, were the changes wrought by the collective hiatus. September 2005, the first month of federal government inaction, was very difficult. Families roamed the country by car, bus, and air. They did so in an information vacuum, not knowing if they had lost their house, their job, a loved one. They survived on the generosity of credit card companies that waived late fees and credit limits, rental car companies that didn't ask where their New Orleans cars had gone, cell phone companies that stopped charging roaming fees and forgave excess minutes. They survived on the generosity of family, friends, and complete strangers.
They also survived on the generosity of destination communities that were usually very welcoming. State and local governments, together with private organizations and individual benevolence, provided clothing, shelter, and food. Schools bent over backwards to accept "Katrina refugees" and PTAs donated backpacks and school supplies. After that first month of inaction, the administration made up with adjustment benefits that were cumbersome to obtain, but generous.
New Orleanians had experienced evacuations before. What was unprecedented about this one was that everyone in the city stayed away long enough to obtain a very good picture of what it would be like to live elsewhere.
2 They found a place to live and became fully engaged in local routines like shopping, going to church or temple, and enrolling the kids in school. It often meant getting a new car, a new driver's license in another state, and a new job. A year later, more than half of the population had not returned. Before the fall of 2005 the city of New Orleans was known for a nationally unrivaled cultural legacy of music, architecture, culinary arts, and theater. But the area was also known for having a very unequal distribution of income and one of the worst public school systems in the country. In 1999, 25.6% of New Orleans households were below the poverty line. Furthermore, though a majority of the population, public school families were politically disenfranchised. Only 27.9% of registered voters exercised their right in local plebiscites that would affect school financing and administration issues.
5 One-third of New Orleans students attended private schools before Katrina, 3 times more than the national average. African Americans made up 65% of New Orleanians, but 94% of public school students. Citywide, 40% of children lived below the poverty line, but the proportion in public schools was 77%. 6 At the 10th anniversary of hurricane Katrina, the city has changed. Only 40 of city's 72 neighborhoods have recovered at least 90% of their pre-storm population (Plyer and Mack, 2015). A quarter of the people who filed federal tax returns from New Orleans in 2005 were filing them from somewhere else in the country (Deryugina et al., 2014) . This 25% will probably never return. 7 Demographic structure and human capital and income distribution also changed. For instance, though both Black and White populations declined, the Black population fell by 44.5% between 2000 and 2013, whereas the White population was only 9.8% lower. 8 The Table 1 ).
The average educational attainment of adults increased: the share with at least a high school degree rose from 75% in 2000 to 85% in 2013, close to the national average of 87%. At the same time, the share with a college degree rose from 26% to 36%, a full six points higher than the national average (The Data Center, 2015a). This obviously did not happen because the entire population became more educated. We believe many of the city's changes happened because of selective return. 10 The educational system was even more dramatically transformed. 
